We received news of the sad passing of Mike Hardy in early January. Mike served in 40th Field Regiment RA, including a tour in Borneo, 47th Field Regiment RA and in The Sultanate of Oman in 1971-72, as Second in Command of the Oman Artillery / 1st Regiment Oman Artillery in the southern province of Dhofar. He retired from the Army in 1999.
Mike arrived in Oman in mid April 1971 and quickly moved to Dhofar. He then took part in a series of military operations almost continuously until April 1972 during which time he was awarded the Sultan's Bravery Medal, WB. For the remainder of 1972 he was busy with the duties of 2ic of the newly formed 1st Regiment Sultan of Oman's Artillery. His own account of some of his operational activities is included below.
Funeral Arrangements
His funeral will be held at 14:30 on Monday 17th February 2025 at Colchester Crematorium (CO2 8RP) followed by refreshments at the Colchester Officers’ Club, 7 Londinium Road, Colchester (CO2 7NU).
If you are planning to attend the funeral and reception following please contact Jimmy Garnier (jimmygarnier@aol.com or 07785 717879) who is liaising with the family, his widow Annesley and daughter Lara, and will provide any further detail required.
The following account was written by Mike as background information for a book.
I was posted on secondment to the Artillery Battery in SAF as the BK but arrived in mid-April (with John Dean) to be 2IC of the newly designated Oman Artillery. First stop was the tailor because Hugh Colley wanted us to be properly dressed in uniform for our office call to CSAF early the next morning and after a couple of days administration at BAF we moved to Salalah by Caribou, John to replace Douglas Maclaine who had recently been wounded in action and me to A Tp at UAG while Chris Long-Price went on leave. I quickly discovered that gunnery in Dhofar was very different to that in Europe. Our only maps were the UK MOD 1967 series at 1:100,000 with no contour markings but with shading to indicate the general lie of the terrain. There was no survey and almost no natural or man-made features which would help in obtaining an accurate fix and there was no met.
Op GIBBETT was mounted on 3 May on the Jebel Aram to the north of Taqah because analysis of shell fragments from recent attacks on the town showed that the adoo had fired Time fuzes, although they had been used as ground-burst rather than airburst. There was no record of Time fuzes being used with an RCL and the concern was that the adoo had acquired and deployed an artillery gun in the area. But whether a gun or an RCL, life was uncomfortable for the residents of Taqah and would become more so if an airburst capability were to become operational.
The operation was significant because it was the first to be mounted with helicopter support (AB 205) for resupply and casevac thus was planned for three days rather than the previous norm of 24 hours. The force was A and B Coys of MR with Tac HQ (including me as FOO), two SAS Tps and FSD and FKW with their BATTS. MR and FKW were to approach from the west, the SAS and FSD from the east with both groups meeting at the peak by first light. In the event, it was shortly after first light when the summit was reached with both groups having contacts on the final approach and MR having 1 KIA and 3WIA. The position was consolidated and helicopters brought in the mortars ( 1 MR and 2 SAS), ammunition and water and evacuated the casualties. As a helicopter was taking off it was engaged by a machine gun which was spotted by Donal Douglas, a B Coy officer, closely adjacent to Tac HQ who hailed me and we met in scant cover for him to indicate the target to me. I carried a “staff pointer”, a handy device from an earlier era for indicating ground, like a small parallel rule with fore and rear sights on each arm and which folded into its handle. With one person indicating using the inner arm and another using the outer arm and seeing the same point it seemed to me to be a quick and simple way to overcome any language difficulties. At any rate, we were using it when the machine gun turned its attention to us with the strike being between me and my rifle on the ground beside me. We dispersed rapidly in different directions and I sheepishly returned during a later lull to recover my rifle but it was a salutary lesson of casual field-craft when engaging a competent foe. Meanwhile, an MR Coy with SAS and firqat support attempted to move into the Wadi Ethon to the north of Jebel Aram but met fierce resistance and it soon became clear that heavy casualties would be incurred with further progress. In retrospect it was concluded that this was probably adoo concentrated cover to withdraw their heavy weapon. Meanwhile, a BATT and firqat patrol had moved to the southern slopes overlooking Taqah and found a well concealed and protected RCL firing platform complete with ammo, one round being fitted with a Time fuze. A firqat who had trained in China confirmed that his instruction had not included these fuzes which perhaps explained why they had been used as ground-burst against Taqah. For the rest of the day there was periodic mortar fire from the Wadi Ethon and perimeter skirmishing and on the second day local patrolling continued with a supply dump of nearly two tons of rice, sugar and corn being found and destroyed. That night an SAS and firqat multiple ambush on the eastern approach to the position resulted in a successful contact although one firqat was KIA and there was again contact during follow-up action the next morning. The whole force withdrew straight down the southern face of the Jebel Aram during the early afternoon of the third day and although the heavy weapon had not been captured the conundrum of the gun and the Time fuzes had been solved.
Op BROCKLESBY was mounted 18-21 May to the east of Adonib by 2 Coys MR and FAN to mine adoo supply routes and destroy the Aqabat Aqashayn. I was GPO for A Tp deploying to Pt 165 for daylight hours with two armoured cars for local defence but withdrawing to Adonib each night. It was an uncomplicated deployment except that we had to conduct a full pre-first light mine clearance for about 500m where our route to the gun position was severely canalised. We had no fire missions but I taught the guns the emergency smoke procedure which I fired as we finally withdrew to Adonib. This caused some consternation with Foxhound because I regrettably had not warned of my intention.
Op COTLEY was a short but intense operation mounted 4-6 June by MR A Coy, Tac HQ (including me as FOO) and FSD with their BATT. The mission was to test the enemy reaction in the Central Area as a result of NFR’s move from Haluf. The force made a night approach to Mt John, the high point on the Midway Road as it begins the descent to Salalah plain, and was firm on the former gaysh position by midnight. The mortars and ammo were flown in by helicopter at 0700 hrs and we believed that this was the first indication that the adoo had of our presence. The reaction was swift and we were engaged from one position at 0745 hrs followed shortly after by fire from two more positions. By 1120 hrs the adoo had brought an 82mm mortar into action and during the next ninety minutes 15 bombs exploded within the defended perimeter and in addition there were a number of blinds, one of which fell in an occupied sangar but caused no injuries. At about 1400 hrs a MMG joined the action and at 1630 hrs came the main attack from six positions with two 82mm mortars firing 20 bombs, MMG fire and small arms fire from adoo approaching to within 300m. An interesting point I noted during my fire missions was that whenever one of my adjusting rounds detonated there would be a short burst of fire at the position at large which I presume was intended as a distraction for me as the observer. The adoo had shown that they remained in aggressive strength after NFR’s redeployment so, mission accomplished, we began our withdrawal at 0130 hrs by an indirect route and were safely into the foothills by first light without further contact.
With only five British officers on the establishment, one of whom was recovering in UK from wounds, we were stretched to provide GPOs and FOOs as needed for the battalion operations thus my job as 2IC (and Hugh’s as well) was not in an office but wherever and whatever the need was greatest. However, at this point Hugh sent me back to BAF to touch base with our small rear party there and undertake some 2IC tasks. But I had only been there for a few days when I was recalled to Dhofar for an NFR operation from Akoot.
When at Haluf, NFR had undertaken a series of aggressive “Hornet” battalion operations where one company, seemingly on its own but covered by another company and supported by a forward fire base, was deployed to provoke an adoo reaction. At Akoot the battalion continued this operational theme with its “Viper” series of operations.
Op VIPER 2 was mounted on 11/12 June into the fringes of the treeline some 7km south of Akoot with C Coy, firqat and me as FOO deployed forward, B Coy providing cover, A Coy securing the mortar fire base and the guns remaining well within range from Akoot. Extracts from the Contact Report state :
“At 0815 hrs one round was fired over A Coy piquet position at a range of 150 yds. Capt Rae knelt up in his sangar to observe the area and was shot by a burst of 3-4 rds SKS at a range of 30 yds from a different area. In all four groups of enemy were located from fire. At 0845 hrs a section led by Capt Braddell Smith moved up to assist the piquet and recover the body of Capt Rae. They came under fire from LMG and small arms from four groups, and 2 x 60mm mortars which fired a total of approx. 25 rds. At 1345 hrs a small group of up to 10 supported by 60mm mortar opened fire on C Coy during withdrawal at a range of 500 yds upwards. Approx 10 x 60mm bombs and 4 x 82mm bombs were fired by the enemy.”
Op VIPER 3, when I was again the FOO, was mounted on 19/20 June into the fringes of the treeline south east of Akoot but there was no contact.
Throughout the year the coastal towns of Taqah and Marbat had been regularly subjected to stand-off heavy weapon attacks and, as Chris Long-Price noted earlier, one of the 90mm anti-tank guns had been deployed to Taqah on 11 February to be manned by local askars. As a direct fire weapon the gun had a limited elevation and thus range and Hugh tasked me to see if the range could be extended in any way. The only feasible solution seemed to be by deploying on an inclined gun platform in the same way as was done for the 25 Pdr firing in the upper register (high angle) where a pit was dug for the trail and spade. So one afternoon I took the other gun which was at UAG and some ammo and with Elahi Bux, my orderly, set off to see what could be done. When in action the ordnance rested on a tripod rather than a trail and wheels so a pit was not an option. Instead I found a nullah with gently sloping sides and brought the gun into action with two legs down the slope and the third up the slope in the direction of fire. So far so good but the effect of recoil was unknown at an increased elevation and I did not want the gun to turn turtle when fired so had brought pickets and rope to lash down the front leg which we did. An unexpected problem now presented itself which was that at an elevation beyond its design parameters the weight of the barrel caused it to run back to end stops as though it had been fired. It was easy to push the barrel back to its proper firing position and hold it there so we did a couple of dry runs with Elahi Bux firing on my order as I whipped my hands out of the way. It seem to work well enough so we then fired live rounds but the range was not significantly increased and this was clearly not a satisfactory method of operational gunnery.
So nothing could be done to improve Taqah’s firepower and by this stage there was only enough ammo to sustain one 90mm gun in action so one of the 75mm howitzers was deployed to Marbat although a similar ammo constraint applied. Nevertheless, the presence of artillery pieces in these towns improved their self-defence and war fighting capabilities and in society such as in Dhofar the prestige and status of the towns was enhanced.
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